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Abstract: Safe disposal of radioactive waste is required in all countries using nuclear power, radioactive materials
in medicine and in industry or research. This contribution presents an overview of the strategy of final disposal of
radioactive waste and summarizes the procedure and present status in Germany. It is concluded that the safe disposal of
radioactive waste is feasible but that the public demand for safety has to be met by applying a stepwise, transparent, and
traceable development procedure for a repository in a safety case to obtain regulatory and public approval.
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Almanya’da Radyoaktif Atık Nihai Bertaraf Yönleri
Özet: Radyoaktif maddelerin ilaç sanayinde, endüstride ve araştırmada kullanıldığı veya nükleer santrallerin olduğu
ülkelerde radyoaktif atıkların güvenli bertarafı bir zorunluluktur. Makale, radyoaktif atıkların nihai bertarafı stratejisine
genel bir bakışı sunarken, Almanya’daki usul ve mevcut durumu da özetlemektedir. Sonuç olarak radyoaktif atıkların
güvenli bertarafının mümkün olduğu ancak kamu güvenliği ve talebini karşılamak için düzenleyici ve kamunun
onayının da olduğu güvenli depolanması için şeffaf ve izlenebilir bir geliştirme prosedürü uygulanması gereklidir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: atık, radyoaktif atık yönetimi, jeokimya, nihai depolama, güvenlik, uzun vadeli güvenlik, güvenlik
durumu

Introduction

Classification of Radioactive Waste

The safe disposal of radioactive waste is required for
the protection of human health and the environment.
In addition high-level-waste consisting of vitrified
waste, structural parts of fuel elements and spent
fuel elements contains radionuclides which have to
be protected against possible use for terrorism or
production and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

The radioactive waste was classified initially as low,
medium and highly radioactive as depicted in Figure
1. This classification became less important since
the technical handling and storage of radioactive
waste is mainly dominated by its heat generation
due to the radioactive decay. Therefore, the current
classification distinguishes between heat-generating
radioactive waste and radioactive waste with neglible
or no heat generation (Figure 1).

The radioactive waste is classified according
to its origin and type. Different containers for
radioactive waste and their intermediate storage are
required. A strategy for disposal, selecting sites and
possible host rocks has been developed. There are
safety requirements for the operation and closure
of a disposal site. The final closure of a disposal site
requires a safety case for long-term safety with safety
analyses and further arguments to demonstrate
safety. The existing and planned repository sites in
Germany are presented.

Heat generating radioactive waste has a
radioactivity of approximately 1011 Bq/m3 or more.
The heat-generation will decline to a negligible level
within several hundred years. The radioactivity will
also decline but requires several hundred thousand
years to reach a level comparable to the natural
background of uranium deposits.
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Figure 1. Classification of radioactive waste.

Origin of Radioactive Waste
Radioactive waste from research and medical use has
mostly a low radioactivity and has no or a low heat
generating capacity. Nuclear power plants are the
major sources for radioactive waste. They produce
low, medium and highly radioactive heat-generating
waste.
Non-heat-generating radioactive waste accounts
for more than 90% of the waste by volume. This waste
contains 1% of the total radioactivity.
Figure 2 depicts the origin of the different waste
types and the estimated waste amounts for 2040, if
the phase-out of nuclear power in Germany takes
place. If the operating lifetime of the nuclear power
plant in Germany is extended, the waste volume
will increase. Radioactive waste from reprocessing
originates from plants in England and France. Spent
fuel elements from Germany were reprocessed under
contract. These contracts have foreseen already a
take-back obligation of the generated radioactive
waste and its disposal in Germany.
Intermediate Storage of Radioactive Waste
Before final disposal, the radioactive waste is stored in
containers in intermediate storage facilities. Different
container types are used. The container ‘Castor’ is
used to transport heat generating waste such as spent
fuel elements (Figure 3a). The container ‘Pollux’ is
146
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Figure 2. Radioactive waste in Germany in 2040 (BFS 2010).

designed for final disposal of spent fuel elements
(Figure 3b). The ‘cocilles’ are for vitrified waste and
residual components from reprocessing (Figure 4a,
b). Simple steel containers or drums, with or without
concrete shielding, are used for intermediate storage
of non-heat-generating radioactive waste (Figure 5a,
b).
The Current German Position on Selection of
Disposal Concepts
Different strategies and procedures for disposal of
radioactive waste have already been discussed and
tested. Disposal in space, the oceans or a permanent
control is very risky, internationally banned or
impossible. Therefore it is agreed that disposal in
deep geological formations is the preferred option for
all types of radioactive waste in Germany. It allows
a centralized disposal and provides isolation of the
radioactive waste from the biosphere. The closed
repository does not need maintenance and hampers
any accidental penetration by human activity. A
more detailed position on future human activities has
been elaborated by the Working group on ‘Scenario
Development’ (2008).
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Figure 4. Cocilles for vitrified waste and structural parts.

• Rock salt provides the advantages of being
impermeable for water, self healing processes
for fractures and voids and being durable
for high temperatures. The most important
disadvantage is its solubility against low
mineralized water.
• Clay stone has a very low permeability for
water and may absorb released radionuclides
very efficiently. Its disadvantage is a lower
durability against high temperatures, thus
requiring a larger rock volume for disposal.

b
Figure 3. Containers ‘Castor’ (a) and ‘Pollux’ (b) for heat
generating waste.

The German atomic energy act (Atomgesetz
2009) regulates that the federal state of Germany
is responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste.
The waste has to be disposed of in Germany. No
radioactive waste must be accepted from other
states. The disposal of heat generating waste and
negligible heat generating waste is done separately.
The costs of disposal have to be paid by the waste
producers. Provisions must be made by commercial
organisations.
The current discussion of site selection is
considering two host rock formations in Germany:
rock salt and clay stone:

• When constructing and operating a repository,
the operational safety also has to be shown
for hazardous incidents and beyond-design
accidents.
• The closure of the repository has to comply
with the Safety Requirements Governing the
Final Disposal of Heat-Generating Radioactive
Waste (BMU 2009). The requirements have the
following objectives:
• to permanently protect man and the
environment from ionizing radiation and
other harmful effects of such waste
• to avoid unreasonable burdens and obligations
for future generations
The safety requirements include safety principles
and criteria. A step-by-step optimization has to be
done. The extrapolated radiation exposure in the
long-term phase is proposed as an indicator. Before
any major decision concerning the site is made, a
147
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specific repository system will be safe’. It includes, in
particular, a presentation of evidence that all relevant
regulatory safety criteria can be met. It also includes
a series of documents that describe the system design
and safety functions, illustrate the performance,
present the evidence that supports the arguments
and analyses, and that discuss the significance of
any uncertainties or open questions in the context of
decision-making for further repository development.
The (NEA 2008) defined a safety case for the postclosure phase of a geological repository as a synthesis
of evidence, analyses and arguments to quantify and
substantiate that a repository will be safe after closure
and beyond the time when active control of the
facility can be relied upon.

a

Long-Term Safety Analysis
The long-term safety analysis is a part of the safety
case and is based on a set of scenarios. In the German
safety requirements these scenarios have to be
classified with regard to their probabilities. Some
scenarios are likely; others are less likely. Both have
to be analyzed in the safety case. Other scenarios are
very unlikely and may be considered in the long-term
safety analysis as what-if cases. Based on the current
state of research and technology the compliance with
regulatory objectives has to be shown by numerical
modeling and analyzing the likely and less likely
scenarios.

b
Figure 5. (a) Containers for non-heat generating waste, (b)
Shielded drums for non-heat generating waste.

comprehensive, site-specific safety analysis and safety
assessment covering a period of one million years has
to be carried out. Requirements applying to the longterm safety assessment are:
• Statement on the long-term integrity of the
isolating rock zone
• Long-term radiological statement
• Proof of the robustness of the final repository
system´s technical components
• Exclusion of criticality
That will be a safety case, which has been defined
(e.g., by NAGRA 2002) as ‘a set of arguments
and analyses used to justify the conclusion that a
148

Figure 6 depicts a what-if scenario of repository
in rock salt which can be used to demonstrate
robustness for unlikely scenarios. There may be
an event generating a water path connecting the
groundwater flow to the repository. The intrusion
of water / brine will enhance the corrosion of the
containers and dissolve radionuclides, which may
then be released to groundwater and migrate to the
biosphere.
The long-term safety analysis will analyze the
consequences of a scenario in terms of radiation
exposure to man. This numerical modelling
requires site-specific information and data as well
as continuing research in order to understand the
relevant processes (e.g., sorption and solubility of
radionuclides, transport phenomena, etc). This will
generate models for computation and simulation of
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Figure 6. What-if scenario for release of radionuclides from a repository.

radionuclide retention, release and transport and
allow the assessment of potential radiation exposure.
The result of such an analysis is given as a
theoretical radiation exposure (dose) which can be
attributed to the release of radionuclides from the
repository. These model results inherently suffer
from data uncertainties and model assumptions.
A safety margin to the regulatory guideline should
sufficiently cover these uncertainties to be robust.
Figure 7 depicts the results from the Swiss safety case
for a repository in Opalinus clay (NAGRA 2002). The
calculated dose is some orders of magnitude below
the regulatory guideline.
Isolating Rock Zone
The German safety requirements foresee the
safe enclosure of the radioactive waste within
the repository for at least one million years. The
prediction of the future evolution of disposal
compartments repository, geology, hydrogeology,
biosphere is becoming increasingly uncertain with
time. The evolution of human societies may be
predicted for some decades, whereas the evolution

of the biosphere may only be predicted for a few
hundred years and the evolution of the hydrological
systems for several hundred years. It is impossible to
predict their evolution of these systems for up to one
million years. Geological evolution may be predicted
up to a million years based on the data available from
the history and its size (Figure 8).
Therefore the German safety requirements foresee
the safe enclosure of the radioactive waste within
an isolating rock zone surrounding the repository
(Figure 9).
The isolating rock zone shall release no or only
an insignificant amount of radionuclides. The
insignificant amount of radionuclides is deduced
from the radiation exposure of man, which is
currently permissible, and serves as an indicator. If it
can be shown that there is no exposure or a negligible
exposure by released radionuclides from the isolating
rock zone, then the compliance with the regulatory
requirements can be agreed. Any additional decrease
of the exposure by hydrology is not considered.
Clearly, the size and the characteristics of the
isolating rock zone are parameters which can be
149

DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN GERMANY

10 2

Dose [mSv/a]

10 1

Typical natural radiation exposures in Switzerland

10 0
10 -1
Regulatory guideline: 0.1 mSv/a

10 -2
10 -3
10 -4
10 -5

14

C(org)

10 -6
10

36

Cl

129

I

-7

79

Se

10 -8
10 -9
10 2

10 4

10 3

10 5

10 6

10 7

Figure 7. Radiation exposure depending on time for a Swiss safety case (Nagra 2002).
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Figure 8. Predictability of compartments.

varied within a certain range. The advantage of this
approach is that the proof of compliance is restricted
physically to the repository system. In total, this
concept imposes higher safety requirements for final
disposal of radioactive waste, but is be more feasible
in technical aspects for numerical modelling. The
safety assessment becomes more comprehensible and
gains credibility.
Current Status in Germany
Germany has four sites which have been used or
are discussed for the disposal for radioactive waste.
These sites are called Gorleben, Morsleben, Konrad
and Asse.
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Figure 9. Concept of isolating rock zone.

1. The Gorleben site is a salt dome which was
investigated to determine its suitability for the
final disposal of heat-generating radioactive
waste. This investigation was stopped in 2000
for 10 years due to a political agreement.
The investigation and the elaboration of
a preliminary safety case were restarted
in October. Currently it is not planned to
compare different sites for final disposal of
heat-generating radioactive waste, in contrast
to the proposed procedure from the AK End
(2002) and the ongoing stepwise site selection
process in Switzerland (BFE 2008).
2. The Morsleben site is a repository for lowand intermediate level waste located in a salt

G. BRACKE

of the facilities is under way and disposal of
radioactive waste is scheduled to start in 2014.
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4. The Asse site is a former salt mine located in
a salt dome. Radioactive waste was disposed
of from 1967 to 1978 as a trial. Brine has
flowed into the mine since 1988, presently at
12 cbm per day. Since 2009 the responsibility
for operation and closure of the repository lies
with the Federal Office of Radiation Protection.
The new operator decided to investigate the
retrieval of the radioactive waste despite the
unresolved technical challenges, since there is
a risk of unintentional flooding of the mine.
Summary and Conclusion
The long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal
shall be provided by geological disposal in Germany.
The current concept for the safety assessment
considers an isolating rock zone which is supported
by its surrounding host rock.

München

Figure 10. Location of repositories for radioactive waste in
Germany.

formation. The repository was established
in the former German Democratic Republic
and was continuously used for some years
after reunification. The disposal was stopped
in 1998. Since then the closure has been
reconsidered and the licensing procedure was
started. All documents were handed in for a
public review. It is estimated that this process
will take 20 years until final closure of the
repository.
3. The Konrad site has been licensed for
final disposal of negligible heat generating
radioactive waste since 2007. The erection

The predicted radiation exposure in different
scenarios, obtained by numerical calculations in
the long-term safety analysis, serves as an indicator
for the isolation of radionuclides. It does represent
a theoretical radiation exposure which is supposed
to have a robust safety margin to the regulatory
guideline.
The final assessment of all data and information
has to be presented within a safety case to obtain a
license for operation and closure of a repository for
radioactive waste.
Overall, the safe and final disposal of radioactive
waste, which means protection of man and
the environment for the next million years, is
supposed to be feasible. Since the public demand
for demonstration of safe disposal is increasing, the
demonstration of its safety has to be updated in a
step-wise approach to comprehensively and credibly
meet this demand.
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